

Dependability Checking with StoCharts

Is Train Radio Reliable
Enough for Trains?

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QEST
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Why train radio?

- European Train Control System
- a new standard for securing trains
- GSM-R radio communication between train and radio block centre



ETCS radio reliability

- **Q:** Can ETCS radio handle trains?
 - fast (300 km/h)
 - in dense traffic (headway \approx 1 min)
 - with high reliability (99.95%)

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 - fast (300 km/h)
 - in dense traffic (headway \approx 1 min)
 - with high reliability (99.95%)
- **A:** Yes!
details on the following slides

Overview

- More on securing trains and ETCS
- Our modelling language: StoCharts
- Our model
- Analysis
- Outlook

Securing Trains: Principles

- Block
 - exclusive access to a single train
 - train is not allowed to leave its block(s)
- Movement authority
 - allowance to enter a block
- Integrity check
 - make sure the complete train leaves a block



Securing Trains: Practice



- Signals show movement authorities to the driver
- Some protection against human error
 - Transmit passage of danger points electronically
 - different national systems

Interoperability


- One railway's train runs on another railway's track
- Mechanical interoperability is implemented
- Broken by different security systems
- ETCS standard intends to overcome this
 - specifies communication between train and track
 - does not specify internals of train
 - does not specify trackside aspects of policy

Securing Trains: New Ideas

- Exchange more information electronically
 - train characteristics
 - track information
 - complete movement authorities
- Cab signalling
- On-board integrity check
- ETCS supports these features


Moving Block Operation

- Enabled by on-board integrity check
- Each part of the block is freed immediately after the train has passed...
- ... and can be reserved for the next train without delay
- shorter headway \Rightarrow better track utilisation



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Speaking technically

- Eurobalise
 - trackside transceiver
 - transmit movement authorities etc. and position



Speaking technically

- Eurobalise
 - trackside transceiver
 - transmit movement authorities etc. and position
- GSM-R
 - a variant of GSM
 - transmit movement authorities etc.
- Cab signalling and on-board integrity check
 - train internal – only a few aspects specified

Level 1

A curved arrow originates from the bottom of the 'Level 1' oval and points to the 'Eurobalise' bullet point.

Level 2+3


A curved arrow originates from the bottom of the 'Level 2+3' oval and points to the 'GSM-R' bullet point.

Level 3

A curved arrow originates from the top of the 'Level 3' oval and points to the 'Cab signalling and on-board integrity check' bullet point.


Modelling Language: StoCharts

- Statecharts
- + Probabilistic choice
e. g. with probability 10^{-4} , a message is lost
- + Stochastic timing
e. g. the response time is distributed exponentially
with average 0.5 sec



$$\text{Prob}(\text{response time} \leq t) \\ = 1 - e^{-t/0.5}$$

Statecharts

- Hierarchical extension of automata



Example StoChart





StoChart Definition

- Nodes
 - with a tree structure
- Events
 - includes pseudoevent after(*stochastic delay*)
- P-Edge
 - P = probabilistic
 - trigger: source node(s), (pseudo)event, guard
 - reaction: probability space over actions and destination node(s)

StoChart Semantics

- Maps on 'Stochastic Timed I/O Automata'
- Random timers model stochastic delays
 - initialised to a sample from probability distribution
 - run down to 0
 - then trigger the corresponding edge


StoChart Semantics



Assumptions and Guarantees


- “Design by Contract” paradigm
- If the environment keeps the assumptions, the system is guaranteed to fulfil its duty.
- Our assumptions: GSM-R works as specified
 - e. g. a GSM-R connection is established within 5 sec with 95% probability.
- Our guarantees: ETCS radio is as dependable as specified
 - e. g. the communication succeeds with 99.95% probability.

Sender Model




Receiver Model

- includes channel model (delay, errors, loss)



Model Analysis



ProVer tool


- simulation tool
- model checker like: estimates whether a probabilistic property is satisfied
 - e. g.: Is the probability of a failure less than 1%?
 - Possible answer: Yes, with confidence 0.99.
- tailored to GSMPs
- developed at CMU by Håkan Younes

Communication Reliability

- Is the communication reliable enough?
- Required by the spec is 99.95%

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Communication Reliability

- 99.95% requirement is ambiguous:
No time bound for communication provided
- Analysed directly using ProVer
- | Time until first message arrives | Probability |
|----------------------------------|-------------|
| 10 sec | 0.98267 |
| 15 sec | 0.999700 |
| 20 sec | 0.9999944 |

Delayed Trains

- How often do GSM-R failures cause delays?
- Challenging scenario:
Two trains at minimal distance
 - for a full trip (~ 1 hour)
 - at maximum speed (300 km/h)
 - with moving block operation


following train



leading train



Delayed Trains



Delayed Trains

- Age of the information cannot be measured directly
- Measure an upper bound

Headway	Probability to brake at least once
57.4 sec	0.9562
62.4 sec	0.101
67.4 sec	0.0036
72.4 sec	0.00034

4 train pairs per hour \Rightarrow
< 1 train per month delayed

Related Work

- Our work is inspired by work of [Zimmermann/Hommel 2003]
 - use stochastic Petri nets (general distributions)
 - numerical solution, not simulation
 - slightly different model
 - entirely different results

Related Work

- Assumptions of Zimmermann/Hommel
 - “deadline” corresponds to a headway ~ 54 sec
 - no multiple failures
 - almost only exponential distribution

Outlook

- Recommendation for reliability
 - Is this service needed always?
Otherwise, a cheaper solution
(= weaker assumptions) could be enough.
- Work in progress:
Analysis with the Möbius tool (via MoDeST)
 - expect easier translation to MoDeST
 - first results are promising: similar outcomes